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CASENOTES
THE SUPREME COURTS "EXCEEDINGLY
[UN]PERSUASIVE" APPLICATION OF INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY IN UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA
r The Supreme Court's decision in the case of United States v.
Virginia1 in June of 1996 was a landmark decision that could
change how future courts approach and resolve gender-based
equal protection claims. The Supreme Court held that the Vir-
ginia Military Institute (VMI) could no longer continue its male-
only admissions policy as a state-funded institution of higher
education.2 The Court's apparent heightening of the level of
scrutiny applied to gender-based classifications from the previ-
ously used intermediate scrutiny to an ambiguous standard
either somewhere between the traditional intermediate scrutiny
and strict scrutiny, or, in effect, a standard equivalent to strict
scrutiny, will further inhibit legislatures from classifying or
treating individuals differently based upon their gender.3 While
many have praised the Court's specific holding, disallowing
VMI's practice of preventing female applicants from enrolling in
the school,4 the Court's application of a new form of intermedi-
ate scrutiny may cause state and local governments to refrain
from providing beneficial single-gender institutions or services.5
1. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
2. See id. at 2269.
3. See id.; Cass K1. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1996).
4. See Patricia Wald, Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: A Reaction, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 603 (1996); Susan Reiger, Wa and the Old/New Face of Sex Discrimination,
43 FED. L. 22 (1996).
5. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Anita K. Blair, The
Equal Protection Clause and Single-Sex Public Education: United States v. Virginia
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However, because the Supreme Court never acknowledged that
it was not applying the traditional intermediate scrutiny test,
United States v. Virginia's precedential effect is questionable
and needs more clarification before lower courts can uniformly
apply a scrutiny test to gender-based equal protection claims.6
To understand the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Virginia, it is first necessary to review and consider the facts
and procedural history of the case. It is also necessary to re-
view the history of intermediate scrutiny in order to put the
Court's present application of the standard in perspective. It is
sufficiently clear that over time the Supreme Court has added
more bite to the intermediate scrutiny standard, and it is sub-
mitted that its decision in United States v. Virginia has brought
the standard one step closer to strict scrutiny.7 This casenote
will discuss the Court's heightening of the standard of review
for gender-based classifications and the effects that the decision
and Virginia Military Institute, 6 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 999, 1000 (1996); Eliza-
beth Fox-Genovese, Strict Scrutiny, VMI, and Women's Lives, 6 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 987, 989-90 (1996).
6. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 190-91 (1st Cir. 1996) (Torruella,
C.J., dissenting); Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 943 F.
Supp. 1546, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
7. Courts generally apply three levels of scrutiny to legislative classifications in
equal protection cases. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
440-41 (1985). The general rule is that courts will apply the most deferential level of
scrutiny, the rational basis test, unless the legislation's classification is based on a
suspect or quasi-suspect class. See id. at 440. Under the rational basis test, a court
will simply determine whether the classification "drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest." Id Intermediate scrutiny, the mid-level scruti-
ny test, has been applied when a legislative classification is quasi-suspect, and has
thus far only applied to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy. See id at
440-41; Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976); JOHN
E. NOWACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.14, 758 (5th ed.
1995). Intermediate scrutiny has required that a classification have "'an exceedingly
persuasive justification!... met only by showing at least that the classification
serves 'important governmental objectives and the discriminatory means employed' are
'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730.
The most intense level of scrutiny applied in the equal protection context is strict
scrutiny. A court will apply strict scrutiny when a classification is based on a "sus-
pect" or "proscribed" class, which has been identified as classifications based on race,
ethnicity, national origin, and in some instances alienage. See City of Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 440; NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supra §§ 14.5, 14.12. Generally, under strict scruti-
ny, classification are constitutional "only if they are narrowly tailored measures that
further compelling governmental interests." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
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might have on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Part I will discuss the recent history of gender-based Equal
Protection Clause claims and the Court's application of interme-
diate scrutiny. Part H will review the facts and procedural
history of United States v. Virginia. Part HI will discuss and
analyze Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion. Finally, Part IV
will examine the implications of the case and its effects on
gender-based equal protection claims.
I. THE HISTORY OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AND ITS
APPLICATION TO GENDER-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
commands that... all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike."8 Although the Equal Protection Clause became
part of the Constitution in 1868, it was not until 1971 that the
Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed,9 ruled that a State had de-
nied a woman, on the basis of her gender, the equal protection
of the laws. The Court asserted that the standard of scrutiny to
be applied to gender-based equal protection claims required that
"[a] classification ... be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation."0 In Reed, the
Court did not suggest a requirement that the State's objective
be important, it merely said that the State's apparent objective
of "reducing the workload of probate courts ... is not withotit
some legitimacy."" Simply determining that an objective "is
not without some legitimacy" is a far cry from the intense scru-
tiny invoked in more recent Supreme Court decisions.'
8. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
9. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
10. I& at 76.
11. Id at 71, 76.
12. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727
(finding the State's proffered justification of compensating women for discrimination
by offering "educational affirmative action" as unpersuasive); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) (asserting that "the mere recitation of a benign,
compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry
into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme").
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In Craig v. Boren," the Court strengthened the test used in
Reed by asserting that gender classifications must "serve impor-
tant governmental objectives." 4 This expansion of the test add-
ed to its bite as intermediate scrutiny continued to evolve. In
1979, in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 5 which was not a
gender-based equal protection case, the Court summarized pre-
vious gender-based equal protection cases in dictum and noted
that "those precedents dictate that any state law overtly or
covertly designed to prefer males over females . . . would re-
quire an exceedingly persuasive justification to withstand con-
stitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause." 16
Then a few years later, the Court decided in Kirchberg v.
Feenstra7 that a gender-based classification was invalid be-
cause the government failed to show an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for the classification, even though the government
had not attempted to offer any justification for its discriminato-
ry classification. 8 Despite its dubious origin in dictum, the
Court was amenable to the "exceedingly persuasive justification"
language and apparently adopted it as part of the test applied
to gender-based classifications. In 1982, the Court assembled all
of these precedents in Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan,' and applied the following intermediate scrutiny test,
which has continued to be applied to gender-based equal protec-
tion claims (and is the test allegedly applied in United States v.
Virginia):
[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies indi-
viduals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden
of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the
classification. The burden is met only by showing at least
that the classification serves "important governmental objec-
tives and that the discriminatory means employed" are
"substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives."'9
13. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
14. Id. at 197.
15. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
16. Id. at 273.
17. 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
18. Id at 461.
19. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
20. Id. (citations omitted).
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The Court also requires that a State's objective and its
means to achieve that objective be "free of fixed notions con-
cerning the roles and abilities of males and females."2' These
"fixed notions" should especially stay clear of "archaic and
overbroad generalizations."22 As will be discussed in the con-
text of United States v. Virginia, when a court believes that a
statute is based on any stereotypes or overbroad generaliza-
tions, a State has virtually no chance of convincing the Court
that it has an exceedingly persuasive justification for its classi-
fication.
II. THE FACTS AND THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF
UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA
A. The Virginia Military Institute
The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is a state-supported
single-sex institution of higher education in the Commonwealth
of Virginia.' Prior to the Court's decision, VMI was the only
single-sex school remaining among Virginia's fifteen public col-
leges and universities.' It was established in 1839 as a four-
year military college by the Virginia legislature.' The Com-
monwealth of Virginia created VMI with a "distinctive mis-
sion.., to produce 'citizen soldiers,'... [who would be] pre-
pared for leadership [positions] in civilian life and in military
service."26
In order to accomplish this mission, VMI utilizes the "adver-
sative model" of training as its method of education for ca-
dets.2' The adversative model is based upon what is called the
"doubting model of education" and features "[p]hysical rigor,
mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of priva-
21. Id- at 724-25.
22. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
23. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2269 (1996).
24. See hi
25. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 2264 (1996).
26. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
27. See id. at 2270.
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cy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desir-
able values."28 The barracks at VMI are "stark and unattrac-
tive" and the cadets are under "constant scrutiny"-as cadets
are afforded virtually no privacy at any time.29 VMI cadets are
required to wear uniforms, to eat together in the mess hall, and
to regularly participate in drills.3 0
Another unique characteristic of VMI's adversative model of
education is the treatment of entering freshman cadets. 1
First-year cadets are exposed to the "rat line," which is an
"extreme form of the adversative model."32 The "rats," as the
new cadets are called, are tormented and punished by upper-
class students during their first year at VMI. This system is
designed to bond the new cadets to their "fellow sufferers" and,
when the year is over, to their "former tormentors."3
The adversative model's anticipated effect is to break down a
young man's previous notions of himself and his ego, forcing
him to overcome adversity; resulting in an improved man who
has learned to trust his fellow cadets and to be a leader among
his peers. 5 The reason that VMI and supporters of its strict
adherence to the adversative method have sought to deny wom-
en admittance into the school is simply because the introduc-
tion of a female into the system would fundamentally alter the
adversative method's application and results.3' However, this
is not to say women could not handle the system or flourish
within it; but the application of the adversative model at VMI
was designed to be a single-sex operation. VMI supporters
assert that the strict application of "equality of treatment, ab-
sence of privacy, [and the] minute regulation of behavior," cou-
28. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated,
976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
29. Id at 1424.
30. See id. at 1424, 1432.
31. See id. at 1422.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1421-22.
36. See id. at 1435-36.
37. "The evidence and findings at trial demonstrate that VMrs adversative meth-
od would necessarily have to undergo drastic modification if VMI were to become
coeducational." Brief for Cross-Petitioners, Virginia, 1995 WL 681099, Nos. 94-1941,
94-2107, at *59.
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pled with the stringent physical rigors demanded of the cadets,
could not occur in a coeducational environment.38 The living
conditions in the barracks are among VMI's most distinguishing
characteristics: (1) cadets have windows on their dorm room
doors; (2) there are no locks on the doors of cadet rooms; (3)
the barracks are stark and unattractive; and (4) cadets must
shower in large "gang bathroom" facilities.39 Also, all the ca-
dets are expected to meet the same physical fitness require-
ments.' These aspects, which may sound like odd or irrele-
vant details, are all important in an adversative environ-
ment.
41
VMI supporters believe that introducing women into this
environment would have the following effects: (1) privacy would
be necessary and thereby cause a significant misapplication of
the adversative method's requirement for the minute regulation
of behavior;' (2) men and women would be less likely to treat
the opposite sex harshly, thereby dulling the effects of the ad-
versative method and the requirement of equality;' (3) compe-
tition among the cadets for the attention of the opposite sex
would disrupt the cadet's bonding and the school's egalitarian
goals;" and (4) the school would be forced to alter many of the
physical requirements, again resulting in a misapplication of
the concept that each cadet receive the same treatment and
conform to the same standards.'
B. Procedural Background
In 1990, the United States, prompted by a complaint filed
with the Attorney General, sued the Commonwealth of Virginia
and VMI.' The complaint alleged that VMI's admissions policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
38. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1421.
39. See id. at 1423-24.
40. See id. at 1438.
41. See id at 1421-22.
42. See id. at 1412-13, 1438.
43. See id. at 1439-40.
44. See id.
45. See itL at 1413, 1438.
46. See id. at 1408.
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ment' After a six-day trial, including "an array of expert wit-
nesses on each side," the District Court for the Western District
of Virginia ruled in favor of Virginia and VMI.' The district
court applied the means-end intermediate scrutiny test articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Hogan.49
Applying this test, the district court found there was a "sub-
stantial body of 'exceedingly persuasive' evidence support[ing]
VMI's contention that some students, both male and female,
benefit from attending a single-sex college."0 Upon this conclu-
sion, the district court found that Virginia's objective, offering
diverse educational opportunities in higher education, was an
important objective.5 Therefore, since single-gender education
can obviously only be accomplished by excluding one of the
genders, the district court reasoned that Virginia's selected
means was substantially related to the achievement of its im-
portant objective by offering single-sex education to qualified
males who desire to endure the unique adversative method of
education.52
The United States appealed this decision to the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.' The Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's decision, finding that Virginia's claimed
objective of diversity lacked merit without a showing of why
there were no publicly funded single-sex schools for women.'
The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a
proper remedy in light of Virginia's violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55 However, the
court of appeals instructed the district court that there were at
least three remedial options available to Virginia: (1) admit
women to VMI, (2) force VMI to go private by abandoning state
47. See id
48. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2271.
49. See id.
50. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1410-11.
51. See id. at 1413.
52. See id.
53. See United States v. Viginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
2264 (1996).
54. See id. at 899-900.
55. See id. at 900.
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support, or (3) establish parallel institutionm or parallel
programs.56
Virginia chose the third option, to create a parallel institu-
tion for women as a part of Virginia's system of higher educa-
tion. ' The school, called the Virginia Women's Institute of
Leadership (VWIL), was offered to the district court as remedial
relief.5 8 VWIL was designed as a four-year undergraduate pro-
gram funded by Virginia and located at Mary Baldwin College,
a private liberal arts school for women in western Virginia.59
VWIL would "share VMI's mission-to produce 'citizen-sol-
diers."'50 However, the VWIL program would differ from VMI
in its academic course offerings and its method of education.6
VWIL was conceived and designed by a task force of experts
in educating women.62 The task force focused on appropriate
methods for "most women," and it determined that a military
model using the adversative system was not appropriate for
VWIL.' However, VWIL cadets would participate in ROTC
programs and a "Virginia Corps of Cadets," but the "VWIL
House would not have a military format, and VWIL would not
require its students to eat meals together or wear uniforms
during the school day."" VWIL cadets would, however, receive
leadership training-including taking courses in leadership and
completing an off-campus leadership externship. VWIL cadets
would also participate in community service projects and assist
in arranging a speaker series. 5
The district court approved this remedial plan.6 Applying
the intermediate scrutiny standard, the district court found that
Virginia was not required to provide a "mirror image VMI for
56. See id.
57. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 473 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd,
44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
58. See id-
59. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2272.
60. Id.
61. See ic
62. See id.
63. Id
64. Id. at 2272-73.
65. See id. at 2273.
66. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 473-74 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd,
44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
1997]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:523
women" in order for it to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause."
The district court further found, based upon undisputed matters
of fact and the testimony of Virginia's experts, that VWIL's
methodology was not inappropriate or ineffective for women and
that "the differences between VWIL and VMI are justified peda-
gogically and are not based on stereotyping." 8
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment."9  The Fourth Circuit applied a
"heightened intermediate scrutiny test specially tailored to the
circumstances" and imposed "specific performance criteria on
the implementation of Virginia's proposal."7° The court viewed
VWIL's mission similar to that of VMI's and gave credence to
the fact that the task force that designed VWIL tailored it for
women and did not just blindly create another VMI.7' Al-
though the court observed that it would have been easier for
the Commonwealth to merely copy VMI's program, it agreed
that this option would have been ill-advised if done for the sake
of litigation and possibly ineffective for most women.72
The Fourth Circuit scrutinized Virginia's selected means more
closely than its proffered objective.73 The court thought that
the judiciary should be cautious when inquiring into the legiti-
macy of a governmental objective and should only refuse to ap-
prove a purpose that is found to be "pernicious."74 It found
that providing an option of single-gender education is a legiti-
mate and important governmental objective, and that the
means applied to achieve this (excluding the opposite sex), was
the only possible way of accomplishing the end.75 Upon reach-
ing this decision, the Fourth Circuit added another step to the
intermediate scrutiny test. It attempted to determine whether
67. Id. at 481.
68. Id.
69. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
2264 (1996).
70. Id. at 1232.
71. See id. at 1234-35. "VWIL would have its students pursue the same five goals
as those pursued at VMI: education, military training, mental and physical discipline,
character development, and leadership development." Id at 1233.
72. See id. at 1234-35.
73. See id. at 1236.
74. Id. at 1239.
75. See id. at 1239.
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the VWIL proposal was "substantively comparable" to VMI.
Although granting that it did not provide women with the VMI
intangibles, like the VM1 degree, the court determined that the
two programs' missions and goals were the same, if only accom-
plished by different methods appropriately tailored by educa-
tional experts.
Both the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia
appealed." The United States appealed the Fourth Circuit's
approval of Virginia's remedial plan, alleging that VWIL was
not appropriate relief and that the relief required was the ad-
mittance of women into VMI." Virginia, on the other hand,
appealed the Fourth Circuit's initial decision that Virginia vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment by not admitting women to
VMI or not providing a comparable single-sex school for women
within its public system of higher education."
III. THE SUPREME CoURT's DECISION IN UNITED
STATES V. VRGINIA
A. The "Exceedingly Persuasive Justification" Requirement
The Court recognized that the controlling precedents in this
case were J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.8" and Hogan,2 both
of which used intermediate scrutiny to evaluate gender-based
equal protection claims. Recall that this test, applied by both
the district court and the court of appeals, compels the state to
show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its gender-
based classification, and more specifically, that the classification
advances important state objectives accomplished by means
"substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."'
76. Id at 1239-40.
77. See id. at 1241.
78. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2264.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 2276.
81. 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause was violated by
the State of Alabama's attorney who used all of his peremptory challenges to strike
male jurors).
82. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that a state-supported university that limited its
enrollment to women violated the Equal Protection Clause).
83. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730. For a general discussion of intermediate scrutiny, see
5331997]
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Both lower courts applied this test and determined it to be
satisfied.' However, for the first time, the Supreme Court
added more bite to the words "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion"5 and the majority opinion made it clear that Virginia
failed to provide this kind of justification. 6
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg detailed the histo-
ry of gender-discrimination cases in the Supreme Court." She
admitted that equating gender classifications with classifica-
tions based on race or national origin is inappropriate." This
acknowledgment suggests that she has not, nor has the majori-
ty of the Court, yet determined that strict scrutiny applies to
gender-based classifications.89 However, Justice Ginsburg then
focused her attention on the question of whether the proffered
justification for Virginia's classification was "exceedingly persua-
sive."" Although Hogan asserted that the exceedingly persua-
sive justification burden can be satisfied by a showing that the
objective is important and that its means are substantially
related to it,9 Justice Ginsburg separated the "exceedingly
persuasive justification" language from the rest of the Hogan
test, treating this language as if it were an additional barrier
to be crossed.92 Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg provided no
supra note 7.
84. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd, 44
F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
85. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-75. Justice Scalia had this to say of the
majority's use of the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification":
The Court's nine invocations of that phrase ... and even its fanciful
description of that imponderable as the "core instruction" of the Court's
decisions in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.... and Hogan . . . would
be unobjectionable if the Court acknowledged that whether a 'justifica-
tion" is "exceedingly persuasive" must be assessed by asking "[whether]
the classification serves important governmental objectives and [whether]
the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives." Instead, however, the Court proceeds to
interpret "exceedingly persuasive justification" in a fashion that contra-
dicts the reasoning of Hogan and our other precedents.
Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
86. See id. at 2274-75.
87. See id. at 2275-76.
88. See id. at 2275.
89. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
90. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
91. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Blair,
supra note 5, at 1001.
92. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
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guidance as to what kind of evidence satisfies an exceedingly
persuasive justification.93 This lack of guidance will increase
the level of uncertainty in gender-based equal protection cases
by forcing every circuit to formulate its own test to determine
whether a proffered justification is exceedingly persuasive.'
The Court was clearly not convinced that Virginia's justifica-
tion was "genuine, not hypothesized... [nor relied] on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities,
or preferences of males and females."95 The Court explained
that the Hogan test cannot be satisfied if the state defending
the gender-based classification relies on such overbroad general-
izations or stereotypes." Much of the evidence relied on by
Virginia and the lower courts was statistical evidence supplied
by experts detailing the abilities and preferences of men and
women.97 These statistics were used to demonstrate gender-
based physiological and developmental differences.98 However,
in J.E.B. and now United States v. Virginia, the Court's deci-
sions reveal that if the Court believes that a state used any
gender stereotypes to demonstrate that its gender-classification
furthers an important objective, the Court will not find that the
evidence supports an exceedingly persuasive justification, even
when the statistics strongly support the alleged stereotypes.99
Therefore, under this interpretation of the Hogan test, a gov-
ernment may not defend its gender-based classification against
the exceedingly persuasive justification requirement with statis-
tical evidence to demonstrate differences between men and
women. Unfortunately, the Court did not provide any guidance
as to what kind of evidence could satisfy this requirement, but
J.E.B. and United States v. Virginia make it clear that statisti-
cal evidence, no matter how persuasive or reliable the lower
courts find it, is not sufficient.'
93. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
94. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 190-91 (1st Cir. 1996)
(Torruella, C.J., dissenting); Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 943 F. Supp. 1546, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
95. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275 (citations omitted).
96. See id.
97. See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1432-38.
98. See id.
99. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2280-82; J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427 n11.
100. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2280-81; J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427 n.11.
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The majority of the Court conceded, however, as it must, that
physical differences between the sexes are "enduring" and that
there are "[ilnherent differences between men and women."101
But the Court asserted that these differences may not be used
to denigrate the members of either sex or as "artificial con-
straints on an individual's opportunity."' 2 While this is cer-
tainly true, Justice Ginsburg, in order to support her conclu-
sion, never acknowledged that there are genuine psychological
or cognitive development differences between the sexes, as this
would contravene her analysis.' Instead, she set up her con-
clusion that the statistical evidence presented by Virginia's
experts must have been based on stereotypes or overbroad gen-
eralizations, and thus did not satisfy the exceedingly persuasive
justification requirement.
B. The Court's "Uniqueness" Analysis
In a very important footnote, the Court acknowledged that
several amici urged that educational diversity of opportunities
is a meaningful governmental objective and that "single-sex
schools can contribute importantly to such diversity."", The
Court asserted that it did not question a state's choice to
evenhandedly support diverse educational opportunities. 5
However, the Court claimed that in the present case it was
only addressing an educational opportunity recognized as
unique, one available only at Virginia's "premier military insti-
tute."' The Court avowed that since VMI is unique, the
Court was not faced with a question of the legality of "separate
but equal" institutions.0 7 As Justice Scalia pointed out in his
dissent, however, a state-supported single-gender undergraduate
program that is not unique would not only itself be unique, but
101. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
102. Id.
103. Justice Scalia had this to say about the majority's treatment of the expert
testimony relied upon by the district court and the court of appeals: "It is not too
much to say that this approach to the case has rendered the trial a sham. But
treating the evidence as irrelevant is absolutely necessary for the Court to reach its
conclusion." Id. at 2301 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2276 n.7.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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realistically "nonexistent.""° Therefore, it is illogical for the
Court to suggest that under hypothetically "normal" circum-
stances, where a state's single-sex institution is not unique, the
Court would relax its scrutiny of a state's proffered objective. It
is submitted that any state-created single-sex institution, educa-
tional or otherwise, will not only have a virtually impossible
time proving that it is not unique, but once it fails to so prove,
the state can expect the Court to closely scrutinize the proffered
objective under a test more identifiable with strict scrutiny,
whether the objective is recognized as benign or not."°
C. The Court's Intense Review of the Proffered Governmental
Objective
Virginia supplied two justifications in defense of VMI's exclu-
sion of women."0 The first was that "single-sex education pro-
vides important educational benefits" and "the option of single-
sex education contributes to 'diversity in educational approach-
es." 11 Secondly, Virginia contended that VMI's unique method
of "character development and leadership training ... [refer-
ring to the adversative method] would have to be modified...
to admit women."" The Court conceded that single-sex edu-
cation does afford pedagogical benefits "to at least some stu-
dents" and that it is undisputed that diversity in a state's "edu-
cational institutions can serve the public good."" 3 However,
the Court asserted that Virginia did not convince the Court
that VMI was "established" or "has been maintained" as a pro-
gram for diversifying educational opportunities while it is cate-
gorically excluding women from educational opportunities with-
in Virginia."' The Court, in effect, considered Virginia's prof-
fered objective of educational diverse opportunities a "post hoc
108. Id. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. "And the rationale of today's decision is sweeping: for sex-based classifications,
a redefinition of intermediate scrutiny that makes it indistinguishable from strict
scrutiny... .Indeed, the Court indicates that if any program restricted to one sex is
'uniqute],' it must be opened to members of the opposite sex .... " Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
110. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
111. Id. (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 20, 25 (No. 94-1941)).
112. Id. (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 33-36 (No. 94-1941)).
113. Id. at 2276-77.
114. Id. at 2277.
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rationalization."" The Court asserted that precedent required
it to refuse to accept benign justifications offered by States in
defense of exclusions when the justifications are not the State's
actual objective, but instead "rationalizations for actions in fact
differently grounded.""8
For the Court to make this conclusion about Virginia's objec-
tive, however, it must have made certain assumptions. The
Court claimed that "[n]either recent history nor distant history"
aided the plausibility of Virginia's claimed goal of "diversity
through single-sex educational options."" The Court is cer-
tainly correct when assuming that VMI was not originally cre-
ated to promote educationally diverse opportunities. However,
Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opinion, noted that the
Court should look only at Virginia's most recent actions, not
drawing any negative inferences from the past, to determine
whether VMI is serving the proffered state objective of provid-
ing educational diversity." He asserted that VMI was put "on
notice," by Hogan, a case that involved single-sex admissions to
a state-supported undergraduate program." Upon being put
"on notice," Justice Rehnquist argued that Virginia should be
allowed to explain and "reconsider its policy with respect to
VMI, and to not have earlier justifications, or lack thereof, held
against it."' ° This thoughtful conclusion would have allowed
Virginia to offer only evidence post-dating 1982 to support its
objective without having the mistakes and stereotypes of past
generations affect its credibility.'
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Virginia's diversity
objective was not a pretext and discussed VMI's Mission Study
Committee and the conclusions this committee made regarding
the future of VMI.' This committee studied the future of
VMI after the Hogan decision."' Justice Scalia claimed that
the committee's findings, and the decision to stay single-sex,
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id at 2277.
118. See id. at 2289-90 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
119. Id. at 2289 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
120. Id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
121. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
122. See id. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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were made after a review of "newly coeducational institutions"
like West Point and a review of "materials on education and on
women in the military."' The committee's decisions were
rooted in a plan for Virginia's future educational direction and
its decision to keep VMI a single-sex institution was part of
this plan.' Justice Scalia also cited one of the parties' stipu-
lations asserting that the 1990 Report of the Virginia Commis-
sion on the University of the 21st Century to the Governor and
General Assembly noted the "hallmarks of Virginia's education-
al policy are 'diversity and autonomy.'" " However, the majori-
ty focused on Virginia's distant history and some of Virginia's
more recent history-when all of its state universities other
than VMI, went coeducational beginning in the 1960s." ' From
this, the Court was willing to assume that VMI was still in
existence for reasons other than those claimed by Virginia."
Applying intermediate scrutiny certainly would involve mak-
ing a determination upon this issue. However, the majority's
complete lack of belief, or even mention of Virginia's objective
as being remotely plausible, demonstrates that the Court's stan-
dard for reviewing a state's proffered governmental objective in
gender-based equal protection cases is intense.' This intense
review requires that a proffered objective for the classification
pass a stringent "believability" test before the Court considers
the well-known "means-ends" test to determine the objective's
importance and the appropriateness of its means.3
124. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2299 (quoting Stipulations of Fact, at 37) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Farmville Female Seminary, Mary Washington College, James Madison Uni-
versity, and Radford University had all been women's colleges, but '[bly the mid-
1970s, all four schools had become coeducational." Id. at 2277-78. In 1972, the Uni-
versity of Virginia became coeducational and "began to admit women on an equal
basis with men." Id.
128. The Supreme Court asserted, "In sum, we find no persuasive evidence in this
record that VMs male-only admission policy 'is in furtherance of a state policy of
'diversity'.- Id. at 2279 (quoting Virginia, 976 F.2d at 899).
129. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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D. The Court's Non-Traditional "Perfect Fit" Requirement
The Court dealt next with Virginia's argument that "VMI's
adversative method of training provides educational benefits
that cannot be made available, unmodified, to women."'' Vir-
ginia argued that the modifications necessary to accommodate
women at VMI would be so "radical" and "drastic" as to no
longer provide men the opportunity to learn under the adversa-
tive method, while depriving women the same opportunity be-
cause the program does not work in a mixed-gender environ-
ment."2 Therefore, there would be a zero net-gain for women
and a loss for men,' whereas permitting a separate school
for both genders would allow the continuation of "adversative
training" for men and leadership training for women. This ar-
gument, articulated in Part II of this case note, was not well
received by the majority of the Court."
The Court admitted that the admission of women "would
require accommodations, primarily in arranging housing assign-
ments and physical training programs for female cadets."'3
However, the Court, relying on a statement by the district
court, asserted, "[ilt is also undisputed, however, that 'the VMI
methodology could be used to educate women. The District
Court even allowed that some women may prefer it to the
methodology a women's college might pursue." 6 In emphasiz-
ing these determinations, the majority of the Supreme Court is
apparently, if unintentionally, heightening the "means" portion
of the intermediate scrutiny standard. Only when courts are
applying strict scrutiny do they require that a State's means for
accomplishing its objectives be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest."7  This normally requires that the
statute's important objective not be accomplished through an
over- or under-inclusive classification (i.e., the classification
should be a near-perfect fit, not improperly affecting many
131. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279.
132. Id.
133. See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1413-14, 1435.
134. See supra Parts IIA-B. See also Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
135. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279.
136. Id (quoting Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 481).
137. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
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persons by exclusion or inclusion)." While in Craig v.
Boren,"s a gender-based equal protection case where the
Court applied intermediate scrutiny, the Court found the State's
classification grossly over- and under-inclusive, no such finding
was made by the Supreme Court in United States v. Virgin-
ia.' Almost to the contrary, the Court merely relied on the
district court's finding that "some women may prefer [the adver-
sative method] to the methodology a women's college might pur-
sue."' This is bordering very close, if not crossing the line, to
the perfect-fit requirements of strict scrutiny. Intermediate
scrutiny has never required a perfect fit, and the fact that a
small and undetermined number of women in Virginia may pre-
fer the "adversative method" does not make the classification
grossly under-inclusive, or even remotely under-inclusive.4
E. The Court's Threshold for "Stereotypes" and "Overbroad"
Generalizations
To this point the Court had found Virginia's "diversity of
educational opportunities" objective a post hoc rationalization
and had determined that Virginia's means for accomplishing
this bogus objective were under-inclusive. To make matters
worse for Virginia, the Court next found that the expert evi-
dence Virginia and the two lower courts had relied on was
based on stereotypes and overbroad generalizations about the
"typically male or typically female 'tendencies.'"' In light of
this finding, and in reviewing the brief submitted by the United
States, it is clear the Court found the federal government
attorneys' stereotype arguments very persuasive.'
138. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
140. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
141. Id. at 2279 (quoting Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 481) (emphasis added).
142. The reasoning in our other intermediate-scrutiny cases has similarly
required only a substantial relation between end and means, not a per-
fect fit .... There is simply no support in our cases for the notion that
a sex-based classification is invalid unless in relates to characteristics
that hold true in every instance.
Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279-81.
144. See id.; Brief for Cross-Respondents, Virginia, 1995 WL 745010, No. 94-2107.
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The Court made it clear that, even when the lower courts
determine that the expert testimonial evidence is credible and
not based on stereotypes or overbroad generalizations, it is
willing to overlook these findings and conduct its own strict
analysis."' While never stating that the lower courts' findings
were "clearly erroneous," the standard applied to findings of
fact,' the majority merely noted that they have "cautioned
reviewing courts to take a 'hard look' at generalizations or
'tendencies' of the kind pressed by Virginia."' Upon this as-
sertion, the Court reviewed some of the evidence received by
the district court and unfortunately compared it with evidence
showing how well women have performed at the United State's
military academies.' That women perform well at the
academies is unarguably true, but Virginia never maintained
that coeducation in a military environment was inappropri-
ate." Virginia and its experts were not saying that women
cannot succeed or flourish in a military training environment.
Instead, Virginia focused on the "adversative method," quite dis-
tinct from the military training environments of the United
State's military academies. Virginia was asserting that the
"adversative method" requires a single-gender environment, and
the number of women who would want to attend and the num-
ber of women who would benefit from an "adversative method"
program would not be sufficient to maintain a VMI-like insti-
tution.5 ' Despite the lower courts' findings, however, the Su-
preme Court appeared to believe that classifications that do not
145. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279-81.
146. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (1995);
Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623
(1993). Justice Scalia took offense to the majority's treatment of the district court's
findings of fact and claimed that "Itihe Court simply dispenses with the evidence
submitted at trial-it never says that a single finding of the District Court is clearly
erroneous.... tT]is approach to the case has rendered the trial a sham. But treat-
ing the evidence as irrelevant is absolutely necessary for the Court to reach its con-
clusion." Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2301 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2280.
148. See id. at 2280-81.
149. The military academies do not provide adversative training, thus a comparison
between VMI and these institutions is not helpful. See United States v. Virginia, 766
F. Supp. 1407, 1440-41 (W.D. Va. 1991) (discussing how West Point changed its ad-
versative system to a more "developmental style of training and emphasis on positive
leadership" since co-education), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 2264 (1996).
150. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2264.
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offer women the same benefits as men must be based on stereo-
types and overbroad generalizations.
F. The Remedial Plan (VWIL)
The Supreme Court noted that the Fourth Circuit "deferen-
tially reviewed" Virginia's VWIL proposal and "decided that the
two single-sex programs directly served Virginia's reasserted
purposes: single-gender education, and 'achieving the results of
an adversative method in a military environment."151 Howev-
er, the Court's precedents require that, "a remedial decree...
closely fit the constitutional violation" and be designed to place
the affected persons in "the position they would have occupied
in the absence of [discrimination]."' 2 In light of these require-
ments, the majority of the Supreme Court found that VWIL did
not afford women an opportunity "to experience the rigorous
military training for which VMI is famed."' Upon comparing
VMI and VWIL, the Court found that VWIL's program, facili-
ties, faculty, and degree are not comparable to VMI's.'5
Virginia maintained that many of the methodological differ-
ences are justified pedagogically and that the mission of produc-
ing "citizen-soldiers" through the use of "education, military
training, mental and physical discipline, character... and
leadership development" made the institutions sufficiently par-
allel.' The Court rejected this, along with the Fourth
Circuit's deference and application of the previously mentioned
"substantive comparability" test.'56 The Court agreed with
Justice Phillips, the lone dissenter in the Fourth Circuit, who
called VWIL a "pale shadow" of VMI.' The Supreme Court
also admonished the Fourth Circuit for not inquiring whether
VWIL would place women who are denied the opportunity to
151. Id. at 2282 (quoting Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1236, 1239).
152. Id. (referring to Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
153. Id. at 2283.
154. See id. at 2283-88.
155. Id. at 2283 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 24 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107)).
156. Id. at 2286.
157. Id. at 2285 (quoting Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1250 (Phillips, J., dissenting)).
(1996)).
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attend VMI "in the position they would have occupied in the
absence of [discrimination]."'
The Court found that the Fourth Circuit's attempt to com-
pare the facilities in a separate but equal fashion was inap-
propriate in determining remedial relief. 9 VMI and the
Fourth Circuit's decision to defer to Virginia's legislature by
applying a "substantive comparability" test was doomed as soon
as the Supreme Court labeled VMI as "unique.""6 One has to
wonder how the majority of the Supreme Court would have at-
tempted to determine whether VWIL was adequate remedial re-
lief had it not found VMI to be "unique." It goes without saying
that one cannot copy something that is unique. Therefore, it is
submitted that if (1) there does exist a situation where a court
does not find a single-gender institution unique; (2) this non-
unique institution has a pedagogically justified objective for
existence; and (3) the state does not provide an exact replica
institution for the opposite gender; then a reviewing Court must
attempt some kind of "comparability" test to determine whether
the proffered parallel institution is appropriate remedial relief
for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
G. The Court's Conclusion
The Supreme Court concluded that VWIL was not sufficient
remedial relief for Virginia's violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'6' In so doing, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's initial judgment
holding that Virginia was in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and reversed the Fourth Circuit's judgment that VWIL
was appropriate remedial relief in light of Virginia's viola-
tion. 6
2
158. Id. at 2286 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
159. See id.
160. Id. at 2276 n.7.
161. See id. at 2287.
162. See id.
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA
The Court has apparently made four changes to intermediate
scrutiny that arguably heighten the scrutiny applied to gender-
based equal protection claims: (1) The Court intensely scruti-
nized Virginia's proffered governmental objective by finding that
it was a post hoc rationalization, which forces state govern-
ments to enact statutes in a fashion similar to regulations un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act where state governments
list the purposes and objectives behind every classification-
based statute; s (2) The Court focused on the "exceedingly
persuasive justification" language and apparently separated this
requirement from the ends-means scrutiny, thereby altering
previous precedents that deemed a classification "exceedingly
persuasive" upon passing the "important governmental objective
achieved by substantially related means" portion of the test;1
(3) The Court held that since there were some women in Vir-
ginia that might prefer the adversative method, Virginia's clas-
sification was not a perfect fit and therefore impermissibly
under-inclusive, again altering previous precedent that only
found gender classifications which were grossly over- or under-
inclusive in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;" s and (4)
The Court completely disregarded the district court's factual
determination that Virginia's expert testimony defending VMI
as "pedagogically justifiable" was valid and not based on stereo-
types or overbroad generalizations, thereby increasing the level
of scientific accuracy needed to convince the Court that there
really might be some differences between the sexes.16
The future effect that United States v. Virginia will have on
equal protection claims could be enormous. While the majority
163. Justice Scalia accused the majority of requiring this when he wrote "[t]he
Constitution is not some giant Administrative Procedure Act, which imposes upon the
States the obligation to set forth a 'statement of basis and purposes' for their sover-
eign acts." Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2274-75; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 190 (1st Cir. 1996)
(Torruella, C.J., dissenting). But see Cohen, 101 F.3d at 183 n.22.
165. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279; see also id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that the selective-service registration
could exclude women even though some women could be drafted for noncombat roles).
166. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279-82.
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of the Supreme Court pretended to be applying the same inter-
mediate scrutiny applied in Hogan, this simply does not seem
to be the case. 67 Justice Scalia was concerned in his critical
dissent that the future of all state-supported institutions,
whether they be schools or rape-crisis centers, are in jeopardy
because they will have difficulty proving to the Court that they
are not "unique" and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.'68  Justice Rehnquist, who
wrote a concurring opinion, was also concerned with the
majority's application of intermediate scrutiny."6  Justice
Rehnquist asserted that "the Court... introduces an element
of uncertainty respecting the appropriate test."'70 This is stat-
ing the point rather mildly.
Since all three courts in this case determined that single-
gender education is indeed beneficial, it would be unfortunate if
the Court's decision causes state and local governments to dis-
continue or refrain from attempting to provide such programs.
Now that VMI and the Citadel, South Carolina's state-support-
ed military college, have been forced to admit women, other
educational planners will certainly be reluctant to try single-sex
education.' In his dissent, Justice Scalia cited a case in
1991, where a school district in Detroit attempted to offer three
public schools for boys, citing "high homicide, unemployment,
and drop-out rates" for inner-city boys and young men as the
rationale.' The school board's plan, however, was halted by a
167. See Cohen, 101 F.3d at 190-91 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting); Engineering Con-
tractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1546, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
168. Scalia claimed that "[ulnder the constitutional principles announced and ap-
plied today, single-sex public education is unconstitutional." 116 S. Ct. at 2305
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 2288-91 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
170. Id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
171. In Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (1995), the Fourth Circuit found that South
Carolina had violated Shannon Faulkner's equal protection rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment by denying her admission to the Citadel on the basis of her gen-
der. This case was markedly different from United States v. Virginia because South
Carolina had not attempted to offer a parallel program to women. Instead, South
Carolina merely argued that there was not enough interest within the State to neces-
sitate providing a women's military academy. This argument was clearly insufficient
and the Citadel was required to admit Ms. Faulkner the following term.
172. See Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(finding the School Board's objective compelling, but holding that excluding girls was
not substantially related to the objective).
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preliminary injunction after the parent of a young girl com-
plained.' 3 The school board ultimately gave up the plan. ' 4
More recently, in 1996, a public junior high called the "Young
Women's Leadership School" was opened for girls in Har-
lem.' 5 Supporters of the school claim that "young women lose
their assertiveness-along with skill in math and science-as
they reach adolescence" as reasons for the separate school for
young girls.' 6 But before the school ever opened, the New
York Civil Liberties Union, the New York City Rights Coalition,
and the National Organization for Women all filed suit claiming
the school violated federal civil rights laws. 77 The New York
City Board of Education is apparently considering opening simi-
lar schools for boys as a defensive measure to the law suit.'78
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Virginia, it will be interesting to see how the courts resolve this
dispute.
The Supreme Court's application of this new intermediate
scrutiny standard has already caused a few courts to disagree
about the level of scrutiny to apply in gender-based equal pro-
tection cases.'79 In Cohen v. Brown University,"s Chief Jus-
tice Torruella of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dis-
sented, claiming that, "the Supreme Court appears to have
elevated the test applicable to sex discrimination cases to re-
quire an 'exceedingly persuasive justification.'" 8  Justice
Torruella claimed that this requirement, as noted above in this
173. See id. 775 at 1004.
174. See Detroit Plan to Aid Blacks With All-Boys Schools Abandoned, LA. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1991, at A4.
175. See All-Girls School: Give it a Try, NEWSDAY, Aug. 25, 1996, at A33.
176. Id.
177. See Sheryl McCarthy, If Kids Thrive at Same-Sex School, So Be It, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 12, 1996, at A58.
178. See id
179. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 190-91 (1st Cir. 1996) (Torruella,
C.J., dissenting); Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 943 F.
Supp. 1546, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
180. 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (determining that the court would review con-
stitutionality of district courtes order requiring university to comply with Title IX by
accommodating athletic interests and abilities of female students under "intermediate
scrutiny test" and that "intermediate scrutiny" was not altered by United States v.
Virginia).
181. Id. at 191 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
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section and Part III, is no longer sufficiently fulfilled by having
substantially related "ends" achieve "important government
objectives."'82 Partly because of the new standard announced
in United States v. Virginia, Justice Torruella voted to reverse
a lower court decision "because it applie[d] a lenient [previous]
version of intermediate scrutiny.""
In September of 1996, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, in Engineering Contractors
Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County,' was admittedly confused
by the Supreme Court's decision and declared, "t]his Court
cannot say for certain whether the Supreme Court intended the
VMI decision to signal a heightening in scrutiny of gender-
based classifications.""s Fortunately for the court, it found
that the classification in question failed the "traditional inter-
mediate scrutiny" test, thus finding it "unnecessary to decide
whether the VMI decision requires ... an even more difficult
burden of proof."" This certainly will not be the last court to
struggle with the Supreme Court's analysis in United States v.
Virginia.
Jeffrey A Barnes*
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 943 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that the county failed to dem-
onstrate it had previously discriminated against minority and women-owned business-
es and thus the affirmative action program was unconstitutional).
185. Id. at 1556.
186. Id.
* I would like to acknowledge Gary C. Leedes, Professor of Constitutional Law
at the University of Richmond for his advice, boundless enthusiasm, and assistance.
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